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Abstract
In this study, we examine how politician inﬂuence aﬀects ﬁrms in international
competition. More speciﬁcally, we use a base model in which ﬁrms classiﬁed
according to two basic rights of corporate governance, namely control right and
cash ﬂow right, may be allocated to politicians or managers. We use this model
to analyze market outcomes for monopoly and international duopoly. By using
these market outcomes, we try to understand mechanism beyond transfer of rights
and eﬀects of diﬀerent ﬁrm governance structures on market outcomes.
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Özet
Bu çal³mada politik etkinin uluslararas rekabet üzerindeki etkileri incelen-
mektedir. Firmalar snﬂandrmak için literatürde skça kullanlm³ olan kontrol
hakk ve nakit ak³ hakk kullanlm³tr. Bu iki hak üzerinden kurmu³ oldu§umuz
model ile tekel ve uluslararas duopol piyasalarn politik basknn oldu§u ve ol-
mad§ durumlarda incelenmektedir. Bu piyasalar inceleyerek hangi durumlarda
politikaclarn farkl ﬁrma yönetim türleri seçti§ini anlamaya çal³m³tr.
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1 Introduction
An important phenomenon in international trade today is the presence of
ﬁrms with varying degrees of government control. Politician inﬂuence on ﬁrms
is a very common experience. There are several national champions in world
markets, especially in those with high ﬁxed costs. Due to market structures, ﬁrms
under political pressure have substantial market power. A well-known example
is Gazprom,which produces %20 of global gas production. Politicians are not
proﬁt maximizers. They have other concerns such as diplomacy, rent seeking or
international political rivalry.
Gazprom is a tremendous tool at the hands of Russian politicians to deal
with anti-Russian movements in the neighboring countries. Belarus, having good
relations with Russia, take advantage of low price in importing gas. On the other
hand, Ukraine, having good relations with the USA, experiences high prices in
importing gas. One other example of Turkey is the Turk Telekom privatisation
case. Before privatisation, politician pressure led to high numbers of employment.
However after privatisation, Turk Telekom ﬁred nearly half of the employees.
Although there is a wide literature on imperfect competition between ﬁrms in
international markets, the role of politician inﬂuence on international competi-
tion, and the interaction between competition and ﬁrms' ownership structure has
not been examined.
While politicians may have various objectives to inﬂuence ﬁrms, here we re-
strict ourselves to one particular objective: Following Shleifer and Vishny(1994),
we assume that politicians get utility from excess labor, though we set up a model
in a slightly diﬀerent manner as we discuss below.
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We deﬁne two rights to model governance structure of a ﬁrm. The ﬁrst one is
control right. Shleifer and Vishny(1994) deﬁnes control right as right to choose
excess labor. In this paper we deﬁne control right as right to choose output level.
The key diﬀerence between this thesis and Shleifer and Vishny(1994) is that they
assume marginal product of excess labor equals to zero. In this paper, we do not
need such a strong assumption. Following Shleifer and Vishny(1994), we assume
control right can belong to the politician or the manager. The second right is cash
ﬂow right. Cash ﬂow right is a right to determine cash transfer from Treasury to
the ﬁrm. In this paper, we assume that cash ﬂow right can belong to only the
politician.
The purpose of the thesis is to examine the interaction between ownership
structure and competition in international markets. In particular, we study the
impact of the distribution of control rights between politicians and managers on
competition between ﬁrms in duopoly framework.
We start the analysis with the case of a monopoly with potential politician
inﬂuence meaning under politician control. Then we start to analyze the case
of a monopoly without politician inﬂuence meaning under manager control.
We assume that ﬁrms with politician inﬂuence have some sort of productive
ineﬃciency due to multiplicity of political objectives. To capture this fact, we
assume manager control results in an increase in productive eﬃciency. After we
fully set up the model for the monopoly case, we study market outcomes under
politician and manager control.
We then analyze the eﬀects of liberalization. In particular in the rest of the
thesis, we examine an international market where there are two ﬁrms from dif-
ferent countries (Home and Foreign). We label Home ﬁrm as the ﬁrst ﬁrm and
we denote Home ﬁrm's parameters and variables with subscript 1. In addition,
Foreign ﬁrm is labeld as the second ﬁrm and we denote Foreign ﬁrm's parameters
and variables with subscript 2.
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We try to answer the following questions:
 How does the distribution of control right aﬀect market outcomes?
 Under which conditions would the politician be willing to transfer control
rights?
 How does liberalization aﬀect the governance structure of the ﬁrm?
 How does governance structure of the rival ﬁrm aﬀect competitive behaviour
and distribution of control right in Home ﬁrm?
 How does market structure aﬀect governance structure of the ﬁrms?
 Under what conditions does a transormation(transfer of the control right to
manager) occur in the context of international competition? In particular,
we try to determine the necessary productive eﬃciency gain that is required
to provide incentives to politicians to transfer control rights.
 Which governance structures may be observed in an international market as
a Nash equilibrium?
This paper builds upon mainly two papers. Shleifer and Vishny(1994) pre-
sented a model that explained many sylized fact about the relationship between
politicians and managers. They introduced two rights to analyze the relation-
ship. The ﬁrst one is control right i.e right to choose employment level. The
latter one is cash ﬂow right i.e right to choose level of transfer from Treasury
to ﬁrm. They try to classify ﬁrms according to the governance structure of the
ﬁrms. Although they explain many stylized facts, their analysis is limited due to
zero productivity of excess labor assumption i.e excess labor hired by politician
produces nothing.
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Boycko et al(1996) develops a model based on Shleifer and Vishny(1994) and
claims that subsidizing private ﬁrms may have more political cost than hiring
more excess labor for state ﬁrms. In other words, they try to ﬁnd which of these
two rights(control right and cash ﬂow right) is more valuable for the politician.
They treat having control right and cash ﬂow right as substitutes for politician.
They ﬁgure out that control right is a better tool at the hands of the politicians.
Chong and Gradstein(2007) tests the inﬂuence of ﬁrms on government policies.
They look on the other way of the relationship between politicians and managers.
They set up a diﬀerent model in which managers try to inﬂuence politicians
by bribing them. The empirical results show that politicians make decision in
the favor of the ﬁrms with high politician inﬂuence and large ﬁrms which may
oﬀer huge bribes. They show that large, government-owned ﬁrms have a better
inﬂuence on government policies and legislation than the others.
This paper is the ﬁrst paper which introduces international competition to
this relationship. As international trade becomes more valuable for economists,
we believe that changes in the structure of international trade will aﬀect the
interaction between politicians and managers.
The thesis is organized as following. In section 2, we theoretically answer the
questions above. In section 3, we analyze theoretical results we ﬁnd in section 2.
Finally section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1. Basics of the Model
In this paper, we provide a model to answer the following questions:
 How does competition aﬀect governance structure of the ﬁrms?
 How do diﬀerent governance types aﬀect the market outcome?
To answer the questions above we should specify two agents for this model:
 Politician
 Manager
To point out the diﬀerence between diﬀerent types of governance structures we
specify two types of rights which can be owned by the politician and the manager
very similar to Shleifer et al(1994):
 Control right: Control right is the right to choose production level of the
ﬁrm. In this paper we assume that the it can be owned by both of the
politician and the manager,
 Cash ﬂow right: Cash ﬂow right is the right to choose the transfer level from
treasury to the ﬁrm. In this paper, we treat this right as a politician owned
right. In other words, only politician can choose the level of subsidy.
In our study, if the control right is owned by politician we refer this type of
ﬁrm as politician controlled ﬁrm and if the control right is owned by manager
we refer this type of ﬁrm as manager controlled ﬁrm.
5
In this paper, we try to analyze the outcome of competition between ﬁrms
with diﬀerent governance types. We analyze 5 possible scenarios:
 Politician controlled ﬁrm under monopolistic market,
 Manager controlled ﬁrm under monopolistic market,
 Competition between two politician controlled ﬁrms,
 Competition between a politician controlled ﬁrm and a manager controlled
ﬁrm,
 Competition between two manager controlled ﬁrms,
To represent the preferences of the politician and the manager, we use similar
preferences with Boycko et al(1996).
The preference of politician is represented by the following utility function
(Up):
Up = γq − T
Here q is the level of production, which is directly a function of employment
level. Therefore we assume that marginal utility of employment(γ) is positive.
T is the level of transfer from the treasury to private shareholders of the ﬁrm.
We do not allowT become negative because otherwise it is a violation of private
property rights. If we allow T can become negative then politician will never give
up control right. For simplicity, we assume that marginal political cost of transfer
is ﬁxed and is equal to one.
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The preference of the manager is represented by the following utility function
(Um):
Um = αpi(q) + T
Here α represents share of the ﬁrm owned by private investors. pi is the level
of proﬁt and T represents the level of transfer.
In a politician controlled ﬁrm, the politician aims to maximize his utility sub-
ject to a participation constraint:
maxq,T γq − T
st: αpi(q) + T ≥ 0
Here the participation constraint represents that private share of proﬁt after
transfer is non-negative.
In manager controlled ﬁrm, the politician determines the level of transfer and
the manager determines the level of production. One major diﬀerence between
politician controlled ﬁrm and manager controlled ﬁrm is concerning the level of
productivity. It is a fact that under politician control ineﬃciency is observed in
production level. To capture this fact we assume that a manager controlled ﬁrm
has productivity level of a where a > 1
Politician's problem:
maxT γq − T
st: αpi(q) + T ≥ 0
Manager's problem:
maxq αpi(q) + T
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2.2. Politician Controlled Firm Under Monopolis-
tic Framework
To analyze a ﬁrm controlled by politician under monopolistic market, we need
the following assumptions:
 Demand Schedule: p = A− q
 Production function under politician control: q = l
 Wage Schedule: w = 1
 q ≥ 0; p ≥ 0
Under the assumptions above we can rewrite the politician's problem as the
following:
maxq,T γq − T
st: α[(A− q)q − q] + T ≥ 0
Optimal values as follows:
Production level:q = 1
2
[(A− 1) + γ
α
]
Price level: p = 1
2
[(A+ 1)− γ
α
]
Level of transfer:T = α 1
4
[
( γ
α
)2 − (A− 1)2
]
Utility of politician:Up = α 1
4
[
(A− 1) +
(
γ
α
)]2
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The comparative statics for the politician controlled ﬁrm is as follows:

∂q
∂A
= 1
2
> 0

∂p
∂A
= 1
2
> 0

∂T
∂A
= −α 1
2
(A− 1) < 0

∂Up
∂A
= α 1
2
[(A− 1) +
(
γ
α
)
] > 0
An increase in demand leads to an increase in the optimal level of output.
In addition to that it increases the level of proﬁt which causes a decrease
in the level of transfer. As a result, a higher demand schedule increases the
utility of politician.

∂q
∂γ
= 1
2
( 1
α
) > 0

∂p
∂γ
= −1
2
( 1
α2
) < 0

∂T
∂γ
= 1
2
( γ
α
) > 0

∂Up
∂γ
= 1
2
[(A− 1) +
(
γ
α
)
] > 0
An increase in politicial return of excess labor leads to an increase in the
optimal level of output. On the other hand, due to decrease in relative cost
of transfer(α/γ) the optimal level of transfer increases. The net eﬀect of
these two eﬀects is positive. In other words, an increase in marginal beneﬁt
of production(γ) leads to an increase in utility of politician.

∂q
∂α
= −1
2
( γ
α2
) < 0

∂p
∂α
= 1
2
( γ
α2
) > 0

∂T
∂α
= −1
4
[( γ
α
)2 + (A− 1)2] < 0

∂Up
∂α
= −1
4
[( γ
α
)2 − (A− 1)2] < 0
An increase in private share(α) leads to an increase in relative cost of transfer
(α/γ). Due to this eﬀect, it leads to a decrease in optimal output level and
an decrease in the optimal level of transfer. The net eﬀect of these two
eﬀects is negative. In other words, an increase in private share (α)leads to
a decrease in utility of politician.
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2.3. Manager Controlled Firm Under Monopolistic
Framework
Manager governance brings more productivity to ﬁrm. To capture this fact we
assume that the production function is diﬀerent than the that when ﬁrm is con-
trolled by the politician. Manager controlled ﬁrm has a better productivity level
which is denoted as ”a” whereas in politician controlled ﬁrm marginal product of
labor equals to 1. To analyze a ﬁrm controlled by manager under monopolistic
market, we need the following assumptions:
 Demand Schedule: p = A− q
 Production function under politician control: q = al
 Wage Schedule: w = 1
 q ≥ 0 p ≥ 0
Under the assumptions above we can rewrite the manager's problem as the
following:
maxq α[(A− q)q − 1aq] + T
We can also rewrite the politician's problem as the following:
maxT γq − T
st: α[(A− q)q − 1
a
q] + T ≥ 0
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Optimal Values:
Production level: q = 1
2
(
A− 1
a
)
Price level: p = 1
2
(A+ 1
a
)
Transfer level: T = 0
T negatif olamayaca§ için sfr.
Utility of Politician: Up = γ 1
2
(
A− 1
a
)
The analysis of the politician controlled ﬁrm is as the following:

∂q
∂A
= 1
2
> 0

∂p
∂A
= 1
2
> 0

∂Up
∂A
= 1
2
γA > 0
An increase in demand increases optimal level of production. Since the
transfer equals to zero for manager controlled ﬁrm, total utility of policitian
increases due to an increase in demand.

∂Up
∂γ
= 1
2
(A− 1
a
) ≥ 0
Since the politician does not control the level of production in the case of the
manager controlled ﬁrm, the level production and transfer do not change due to
an increase in political marginal beneﬁt of excess labor. As a result, an increase
in political marginal beneﬁt of excess labor only increases the total utility of the
politician.
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∂q
∂a
= 1
2
( 1
a2
) > 0

∂p
∂a
= −1
2
( 1
a2
) < 0

∂Up
∂a
= γ 1
2
( 1
a2
) > 0
A higher productivity level leads to an increase in optimal level of production.
Since the transfer equals zero for manager controlled ﬁrm, politician has a higher
utility if the productivity level is higher.
2.4. Politician Controlled Firm against Politician
Controlled Firm
After market liberalization we have two rival ﬁrms in the same market. We
name the ﬁrst ﬁrm as Home ﬁrm and the second ﬁrm as Foreign ﬁrm.
General assumption about the market structure is that:
Demand Schedule: p = A− q1 − q2
where q1is production level of Home ﬁrm and q2is production level of Foreign
ﬁrm.
Problem of Home Politician :
maxq1,T1 γ1q1 − T1
st: α1(A− 1− q1 − q2)q1 + T1 ≥ 0
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Problem of Foreign Politician:
maxq2,T2 γ2q2 − T2
st: α2(A− 1− q1 − q2)q2 + T2 ≥ 0
Equilibrium Values:
Home ﬁrm's production: q1 = 13 [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's production: q2 = 13 [(A− 1) + 2 γ2α2 − γ1α1 ]
Total production: Q = 1
3
[2(A− 1) + γ2
α2
+ γ1
α1
]
Market Price: p = 1
3
[A+ 2− γ1
α1
− γ2
α2
]
Home ﬁrm's market share: S1 = [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]/[2(A− 1) + γ2α2 + γ1α1 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's market share: S2 = [(A− 1) + 2 γ2α2 − γ1α1 ]/[2(A− 1) + γ2α2 + γ1α1 ]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi1 = 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 − γ2α2 ][(A− 1)− γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's proﬁt:pi2 = 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ2α2 − γ1α1 ][(A− 1)− γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]
Home ﬁrm's transfer: T1 = −α1 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 − γ2α2 ][(A− 1)− γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's transfer: T2 = −α2 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ2α2 − γ1α1 ][(A− 1)− γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]
Home politician's utility: Up1 = α1
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ1
α1
− γ2
α2
]2
Foreign politician's utility: Up2 = α2
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ2
α2
− γ1
α1
]2
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2.5. Politician Controlled Firm against Manager
Controlled Firm
In this scenario, Foreign ﬁrm, the manager controlled ﬁrm, has a better pro-
ductivity level (a2) than the Home ﬁrm which is under politician control.
Problem of Home Politician:
maxq1,T1 γ1q1 − T1
st: α1[(A− q1 − q2)q1 − q1] + T1 ≥ 0
Problem of Foreign Manager :
maxq2 α2[(A− q1 − q2)q2 − (1/a2)q2] + T2
Problem of Foreign Politician:
maxT2 γ2q2 − T2
st: α2[(A− q1 − q2)q2 − (1/a2)q2] + T2 ≥ 0
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Equilibrium Values:
Home ﬁrm's production: q1 = 13 [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 −
(
1− 1
a2
)
]
Foreign ﬁrm's production: q2 = 13 [(A− 1) + 2
(
1− 1
a2
)
− γ1
α1
]
Total production: Q = 1
3
[(2A− 1) + γ1
α1
− 1
a2
]
Market price: p = 1
3
[A+ 1− γ1
α1
+ 1
a2
]
Home ﬁrm's market share: S1 = [(A− 2) + 2 γ1α1 + 1a2 ]/[(2A− 1) + γ1α1 − 1a2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's market share: S2 = [(A+ 1)− 2 1a2 − γ1α1 ]/[(2A− 1) + γ1α1 − 1a2 ]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi1 = 19 [(A− 2)− γ1α1 + 1a2 ][(A− 2) + 2 γ1α1 + 1a2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi2 = 19 [(A+ 1)− 2 1a2 − γ1α1 ][(A+ 1)− γ1α1 − 2 1a2 ]
Home politician's transfer: T1 = −α1 19 [(A− 2)− γ1α1 + 1a2 ][(A− 2) + 2 γ1α1 + 1a2 ]
Foreign politician's transfer: T2 = 0
Home politician's utility: Up1 = α1
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ1
α1
+ 1
a2
]2
Foreign politician's utility: Up2 = γ2
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a2
− γ1
α1
]
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2.6. Manager Controlled Firm against Manager
Controlled Firm
In this scenario, Home ﬁrm has productivity level of a1 and Foreign ﬁrm has
productivity level of a2.
Problem of Home Manager :
maxq1 α1[(A− q1 − q2)q1 − (1/a1)q1] + T1
Problem of Home Politician :
maxT1 γ1q1 − T1
st: α1[(A− q1 − q2)q1 − (1/a1)q1] + T1 ≥ 0
Problem of Foreign Manager:
maxq2 α2[(A− q1 − q2)q2 − (1/a2)q2] + T2
Problem of Foreign Politician:
maxT2 γ2q2 − T2
st: α2[(A− q1 − q2)q2 − (1/a2)q2] + T2 ≥ 0
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Equilibrium Values:
Home ﬁrm's production: q1 = 13 [A− 2 1a1 + 1a2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's production: q2 = 13 [A− 2 1a2 + 1a1 ]
Total production: Q = 1
3
[2A− 1
a1
− 1
a2
]
Market price: p = 1
3
[A+ 1
a1
+ 1
a2
]
Home ﬁrm's market share: S1 = [A− 2 1a1 + 1a2 ]/[2A− 1a1 − 1a2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's market share: S2 = [A− 2 1a2 + 1a1 ]/[2A− 1a1 − 1a2 ]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi1 = 19 [A− 2 1a1 + 1a2 ][(A− 1) + 1a1 + 1a2 ]
Foreign ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi2 = 19 [A− 2 1a2 + 1a1 ][(A− 1) + 1a1 + 1a2 ]
Home politician's transfer: T1 = 0
Foreign politician's transfer: T2 = 0
Home politician's utility: Up1 = γ1
1
3
[A− 2 1
a1
+ 1
a2
]
Foreign politician's utility: Up2 = γ2
1
3
[A− 2 1
a2
+ 1
a1
]
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3. General Results
3.1. Monopoly
In this section, we analyze the monopoly outcomes under politician control
and manager control.
We ﬁrst start with politician control. Let us remember market outcome under
politician control:
Production level:q = 1
2
[A− 1 + γ
α
]
Market price: p = 1
2
[A+ 1− γ
α
]
Proﬁt: pi = 1
4
[(A− 1)2 − ( γ
α
)2]
Level of transfer: T = α 1
4
[(A− 1)2 − ( γ
α
)2]
Utility of politician: Up = α 1
4
[(A− 1) + γ
α
]2
If we compare this production level with ordinary monopoly production
(
1
2
(A− 1)
)
,
we have an additional part
(
1
2
(
γ
α
))
. This part represents eﬀect of politician in-
ﬂuence in the ﬁrm. Notice that the additional part is positively correlated with
politician interest (γ), meaning a higher politician interest to the ﬁrm leads to
higher level of output. On the other hand, the additional part is negatively cor-
related with private share (α). A higher private share increases the required level
of cash ﬂow to the ﬁrm and that leads decreases the utility of the politician and
the politician decrease output level.
If we compare the price level by ordinary monopoly level of price
(
1
2
(A+ 1)
)
,
we also have an additional part here
(
−1
2
γ
α
)
. Due to politician inﬂuence we have
higher level of output and lower level of price compared to ordinary monopoly
market outcome.
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Now, we start analyzing a monopoly ﬁrm under manager control. Let us
remember market outcomes of this scenario:
Production level: q = 1
2
((A− 1) +
(
1− 1
a
)
)
Market price: p = 1
2
((A+ 1)−
(
1− 1
a
)
)
Proﬁt: pi = 1
4
(A− 1
a
)2
Level of transfer: T = 0
Utility of politician: Up = γ 1
2
(A− 1
a
)
If we compare the production level with ordinary monopoly production
(
1
2
(A− 1)
)
,
we have an additional part
(
1
2
(
1− 1
a
))
. This part represents eﬀect of produc-
tive eﬃciency due to manager control. Notice that a higher level of productivity
(a)leads to more output and lower price.
Lastly, we analyze the necessary condition for transformation(transfer of con-
trol rights to manager). We assume that politician makes the decision about
transformation. Because of this, politician must get a better utility from a man-
ager controlled ﬁrm then a politician controlled one as a necessary condition for
transformation:
γ 1
2
(
A− 1
a
)
≥ α 1
4
(
(A− 1) + γ
α
)2
By using this inequality, we obtain a threshold level of productivity for trans-
formation (a∗).
a∗ =
γ
α
2A γ
α
−((A−1)+ γα)
2
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We conclude that if manager control brings productivity above this level politi-
cian will choose transformation and for productivity levels below the threshold,
we observe a politician controlled ﬁrm.
Now, let us analyze the threshold level. The relations between this threshold
and parameters of the model are as the following:
 Politician interest (γ): Positively aﬀects the threshold,
 Private share (α): Negatively aﬀects the threshold,
 Market size(A): Positively aﬀects the threshold.
To sum up, the necessary productive gain of transformation(transfer of the
control rights to manager) must be high for transformation in the markets with
 high politician interest(γ1),
 low degree of privitisation(α1),
 high market size(A).
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3.2. After Liberalization against a Politician Con-
trolled Firm
In this section, we analyze potential market outcomes after market liberal-
ization when Foreign ﬁrm is under politician control. We start with the market
outcome when Home ﬁrm is also under politician control. to make the analysis,
let us remember the market outcome if both ﬁrms are under politician control.
Home ﬁrm's production: q1 = 13 [(A− 1) + 2( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )]
Price level: p = 1
3
[A+ 2− ( γ1
α1
)− ( γ2
α2
)]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi1 = 19 [(A− 1) + 2( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )][(A− 1)− ( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )]
Home ﬁrm's transfer level:
T1 = −α1 19 [(A− 1) + 2( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )][(A− 1)− ( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )]
Home politician's utility:Up1 = α1
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2( γ1
α1
)− ( γ2
α2
)]2
If we compare this output level with ordinary duopoly output
(
1
3
(A− 1)
)
, we
have an additional term here
(
2
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
γ2
α2
))
.The ﬁrst part of this term
(
2
(
γ1
α1
))
represents the eﬀect of Home politician inﬂuence. The second part
(
−
(
γ2
α2
))
represents
the eﬀect of Foreign politician inﬂuence. Notice that the additional term can be
positive or negative. If Foreign politician is aggresive
(
γ2
α2
is high
)
enough then
market demand for Home ﬁrm falls after market liberalization.
If we compare the price level with ordinary duopoly price level
(
1
3
(A+ 2)
)
,
we have an additional term
(
−1
3
(
γ1
α1
)
− 1
3
(
γ2
α2
))
. Since this term is negative, we
can conclude that after market liberalization, we have lower level of price then
the ordinary duopoly price.
Now, we analyze the scenario in which Home ﬁrm is a manager controlled ﬁrm.
Let us remember the market outcome where Home ﬁrm is a manager controlled
ﬁrm and Foreign ﬁrm is a politician controlled ﬁrm.
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To compare this outcome with the outcome under manager control let us
remember the market outcome where there is a manager controlled ﬁrm in the
Home country and a politician controlled ﬁrm in the Foreign country.
Home ﬁrm's production: q1 = 13
[
(A− 1) + 2
(
1− 1
a1
)
−
(
γ2
α2
)]
Price level: p = 1
3
[
(A+ 2)−
(
1− 1
a1
)
−
(
γ2
α2
)]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt: pi1 = 19 [(A+ 1)− 2( 1a1 )− ( γ2α2 )][(A+ 1) + ( 1a1 )− ( γ2α2 )]
Home ﬁrm's transfer level: T1 = 0
Home politician's utility level: Up1 = γ1
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2( 1
a1
)− ( γ2
α2
)]
If we compare the output level with ordinary duopoly output level
(
1
3
(A− 1)
)
,
we have an additional term
(
2
3
(
1− 1
a1
)
− 1
3
(
γ2
α2
))
. The ﬁrst part of this term(
2
3
(
1− 1
a1
))
represents the eﬀect of Home ﬁrm productive superiority and the
second part
(
−1
3
(
γ2
α2
))
represents the eﬀect of Foreign politician inﬂuence on
Home ﬁrm market demand.
Similar with the previous scenario after market liberalisation, price level under
this scenario is lower than price level of ordinary duopoly case.
(
1
3
(A+ 2)
)
Now, let us derive the necessary condition for transformation. As we did in
the previous part, necessary condition for transformation simply tells us Home
politician should have a better level of utility from a manager controlled ﬁrm then
he had from a politician controlled ﬁrm:
γ1
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2( 1
a1
)− ( γ2
α2
)] ≥ α1 19 [(A− 1) + 2( γ1α1 )− ( γ2α2 )]2
By using this inequality, we have a productivity threshold of Home ﬁrm for
transformation(ap) when Foreign ﬁrm is under politician control
ap =
6(
γ1
α1
)
3(
γ1
α1
)[(A+1)−( γ2
α2
)]−[(A−1)+2
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
γ2
α2
)
]2
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The analysis of this threshold is below:
 Politician interest in Home ﬁrm (γ1): positively aﬀect the threshold.
 Private share of Home ﬁrm (α1): negatively aﬀect the threshold.
 Politician interest in Foreign ﬁrm (γ2): negatively aﬀect the threshold.
 Private share of Foreign ﬁrm (α2): positively aﬀect the threshold.
 Market size(A): eﬀect of market size depends on other parameters. To see
that let us take the derivative of the threshold with respect to market size
parameter:
(
6
(
γ1
α1
))(
2(A−1)+
(
γ1
α1
)
−2
(
γ2
α2
))
{
3(
γ1
α1
)[(A+1)−( γ2
α2
)]−[(A−1)+2
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
γ2
α2
)
]2
}2
If the Foreign ﬁrm is aggresive(γ2/α2 is high) enough then the derivative be-
comes negative. In other words, more aggresive politician controlled rival com-
bined with high market size decreases the threshold productivity level for trans-
formation of Home ﬁrm. The reason for this result is that if the rival ﬁrm is
aggresive then it means that it steals more of Home ﬁrm's market share. As a
result, politician may accept transformation with a small productivity gain.
If the Foreign ﬁrm is not very aggresive (γ2/α2 is low) then the derivative be-
comes positive. In other words, less aggresive politician controlled rival combined
with high market size increases the threshold productivity level for transformation
of Home ﬁrm. The reason for this result is that if the rival ﬁrm is less aggresive
then it means that Home ﬁrm steals more of Foreign ﬁrm's market share. As a
result, politician may accept transformation only for high productivity gain.
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In conclusion, against a politician controlled Foreign ﬁrm, high productivity
level is needed for transformation of Home ﬁrm in the markets with
 high politician interest at Home ﬁrm(γ1),
 low private share at Home ﬁrm(α1),
 low politician interest at Foreign ﬁrm(γ2),
 high private share at Foreign ﬁrm(α2).
3.3. After Liberalization Against a Manager Con-
trolled Firm
In this section, we analyze potential market outcomes after market liberalisa-
tion when Foreign ﬁrm is a manager controlled ﬁrm. We start with the scenario
where Home ﬁrm is under politician control. To make the analysis, let us remem-
ber market outcome when Home ﬁrm is a politician controlled ﬁrm and Foreign
ﬁrm is a manager controlled ﬁrm.
Home ﬁrm's production level:q1 = 13
[
(A− 1) + 2
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
1− 1
a2
)]
Price level: p = 1
3
[
(A+ 2)−
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
1− 1
a2
)]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt:pi1 = 19
[
(A− 2)−
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)] [
(A− 2) + 2
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
Home ﬁrm's transfer level:T1 = α1 19
[(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
1
a2
)
− (A− 2)
] [
(A− 2) + 2
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
Home politician's utility level: Up1 =α1
1
9
[
(A− 2) + 2
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]2
If we remember regular duopoly production level
(
1
3
(A− 1)
)
, here we have
an additional part
(
2
3
(
γ1
α1
)
− 1
3
(
1−
(
1
a2
)))
. The ﬁrst part
(
2
3
(
γ1
α1
))
represents
the eﬀect of politician inﬂuence of Home ﬁrm. Second part
(
−1
3
(
1−
(
1
a2
)))
represents the eﬀect of Foreign ﬁrm productive superiority on Home ﬁrm's market
demand.
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If we compare this price level with ordinary duopoly price
(
1
3
(A+ 2)
)
, we have
an additional term
(
−
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
1− 1
a2
))
. Since this additional part is negative
we conclude that after liberalisation the price level is less than ordinary duopoly
price.
Now, we analyze the scenario in which Home and Foreign ﬁrms are manager
controlled ﬁrms. Let us remember the market outcome when both ﬁrms are
manager controlled ﬁrms:
Home ﬁrm's production level:q1 = 13
[
A− 2
(
1
a1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
Price level: p = 1
3
[
A+
(
1
a1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
Home ﬁrm's proﬁt level:pi1 = 19
[
A− 2
(
1
a1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
Home ﬁrm's transfer level:T1 = 0
Home politician's utility level:Up1 = γ1
1
3
[
A− 2
(
1
a1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
If we compare production level with duopoly production level, we have an addi-
tional part
(
2
(
1−
(
1
a1
))
−
(
1−
(
1
a2
)))
. Here the ﬁrst part
(
2
(
1−
(
1
a1
)))
represents
eﬀect of Home ﬁrm productive eﬃciency on Home ﬁrm output decision and the
second part
(
−
(
1−
(
1
a2
)))
represents eﬀect of Foreign ﬁrm productive eﬃciency
on Home ﬁrm output decision.
The price level is lower than regular duopoly price level
(
1
3
(A+ 2)
)
due to
superior productive eﬃciency of both ﬁrms.
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Now let us derive the necessary condition for transformation in Home ﬁrm.
For tansformation, politician must have a better utility in manager controlled
ﬁrm than he has in politician controlled ﬁrm:
γ1
1
3
[
A− 2
(
1
a1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]
≥ α1 19
[
(A− 2) + 2
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)]2
By using this inequality, we have a productivity threshold(am):
am =
6(
γ1
α1
)
3(
γ1
α1
)[(A+( 1
a2
)]−[(A−2)+2
(
γ1
α1
)
+
(
1
a2
)
]2
If we analyze the relationship between the threshold and other parameters:
 Home politician interest(γ1): positively aﬀects the threshold,
 Home private share (α1): negatively aﬀects the threshold,
 Foreign productivity (a2): negatively aﬀects the threshold,
 Market size (A): eﬀect of market size depends on other parameters. To see
that let us take the derivative of the threshold with respect to market size
parameter:
(
6
(
γ1
α1
))(
2(A−1)+
(
γ1
α1
)
−2
(
1− 1
a2
))
{
3(
γ1
α1
)[(A+1)−(1− 1
a2
)]−[(A−1)+2
(
γ1
α1
)
−
(
1− 1
a2
)
]2
}2
If Foreign ﬁrm is productive (a2 is high) enough an increase in market size(A)decreases
the threshold level.
If Foreign ﬁrm is not productive (a2 is not high)enough an increase in market
size(A)increases the threshold level.
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3.4. Governance Game
In this section we try to analyze potential Nash equilibria of a governance
game. Let us deﬁne governance game ﬁrst.
A governance game(G) consists of the following components:
 Players: Home politician, Foreign politician
 Actions: Control right to politician, Control right to manager
 Payoﬀ matrix:
Foreign
Politician Control Manager Control
Home
Politician Control
α1
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ1
α1
− γ2
α2
]2 α1
1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ1
α1
+ 1
a2
]2
α2
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ2
α2
− γ1
α1
]2 γ2
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a2
− γ1
α1
]
Manager Control
γ1
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a1
− γ2
α2
] γ1
1
3
[A− 2 1
a1
+ 1
a2
]
α2
1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ2
α2
+ 1
a1
]2 γ2
1
3
[A− 2 1
a2
+ 1
a1
]
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Governance game we describe above has a complicated payoﬀ matrix. Because
of this we impose symmetry assumption and try to make analysis easier.
Under Symmetry Assumption
Foreign
Politician Control Manager Control
Home
Politician Control
α 1
9
[(A− 1) + γ
α
]2 α 1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ
α
+ 1
a
]2
α 1
9
[(A− 1) + γ
α
]2 γ 1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a
− γ
α
]
Manager Control
γ 1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a
− γ
α
] γ 1
3
[A− 1
a
]
α 1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ
α
+ 1
a
]2 γ 1
3
[A− 1
a
]
Even the symmetric case payoﬀ matrix is complicated. As a result, we try to
analyze the conditions for each possible outcome.
(Politician Control, Politician Control) is a Nash equilibrium if
α1
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ1
α1
− γ2
α2
]2 ≥ γ1 13 [(A+ 1)− 2 1a1 − γ2α2 ]
and
α2
1
9
[(A− 1) + 2 γ2
α2
− γ1
α1
]2 ≥ γ2 13 [(A+ 1)− 2 1a2 − γ1α1 ].
The equations are more likely to hold if productivity gains from transformation
are small enough depending on the rest of the parameters.
(Politician Control, Manager Control) is a Nash equilibrium if
α1
1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ1
α1
+ 1
a2
]2 ≥ γ1 13 [A− 2 1a1 + 1a2 ]
and
γ2
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a2
− γ1
α1
] ≥ α2 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ2α2 − γ1α1 ]2
The equations are more likely to hold if productivity gain of transformation
is large for Foreign ﬁrm and small for Home ﬁrm depending on the rest of the
parameters.
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(Manager Control, Politician Control) is a Nash equilibrium if
γ1
1
3
[(A+ 1)− 2 1
a1
− γ2
α2
] ≥ α1 19 [(A− 1) + 2 γ1α1 − γ2α2 ]2
and
α2
1
9
[(A− 2) + 2 γ2
α2
+ 1
a1
]2 ≥ γ2 13 [A− 2 1a2 + 1a1 ]
The equations are more likely to hold if productivity gain of transformation is
large for Home ﬁrm and small for Foreign ﬁrm then depending on the rest of the
parameters.
(Manager Control, Manager Control) is a Nash equilibrium if
γ1
1
3
[A− 2 1
a1
+ 1
a2
] ≥ α1 19 [(A− 2) + 2 γ1α1 + 1a2 ]2
and
γ2
1
3
[A− 2 1
a2
+ 1
a1
] ≥ α2 19 [(A− 2) + 2 γ2α2 + 1a1 ]2
The equations tell us that if productivity gain of transformation is high enough
for Home ﬁrm and Foreign ﬁrm then depending on the rest of the parameters.
As a result, depending on the rest of the parameters a country with high
beneﬁts of transformation is more likely to choose manager control as a best
response in the governance game.
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4. Conclusion
In this thesis, we focus on eﬀects of market structure on ﬁrm's governance
structure. And we ask the following questions: How does the distribution of con-
trol right aﬀect market outcomes? Under which conditions would the politician
be willing to transfer control rights? How does liberalization aﬀect the governance
structure of the ﬁrm? How does governance structure of rival ﬁrm aﬀect compet-
itive behaviour and distribution of control right in Home ﬁrm? How does market
structure aﬀect governance strructure of the ﬁrms? Under what conditions does
a transormation(transfer of the control right to manager) occur in the context
of international competition. Which governance structures may be observed in
an international market as a Nash equilibrium? Therefore the objective of this
study is mainly studying ﬁrm's governance structures under monopolistic and
duopolistic frameworks.
In chapter 3, we show how ﬁrm's governance structure changes under mo-
nopolistic and duopolistic frameworks. In this chapter, we show that tr ans-
formation(transfer of control right to manager) occurs in the country with low
politician interest and high degree of privatisation. In addition, we show that
after market liberalisation, entrant with high politician interest, low degree of
privatisation and high productive superiority increases chance for transformation
for the incumbent ﬁrm. Lastly, we analyze possible governance structures under
duopolistic framework and we show that all possible governance structure pairs
can be a Nash equilibrium.
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